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The Public Option: Government-Provided 
Off-Street Parking in Downtown 
Philadelphia 
 
John P. Caskey* 
 
As of late 2009, the Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA) owned and 
operated eight off-street parking facilities in downtown Philadelphia. At the 
same time, there were 134 private-sector commercial parking facilities in 
downtown. This paper argues that there is no economic rationale for PPA’s 
presence in the market, because PPA’s exit would lead to almost no 
detectable effect on either the supply or pricing of off-street parking. Thus, 
one can only understand the presence of the public option by taking an 
historical and political perspective. The City entered the off-street parking 
market in the 1950s because the automobile was undermining the 
competitiveness of downtown businesses and these business interests 
complained that the private sector was not meeting the need quickly or 
cheaply enough. Their political clout and the desire by the City to halt the 
relative decline of downtown property values led the City to enter this 
market. The City used a public authority to carry out this policy because a 
parking authority could be fiscally independent of the City and, it was 
argued, would be apolitical. Shortly after its creation, however, local—and 
later state—politicians recognized that the PPA could be used for 
patronage employment, something that early advocates of parking 
authorities apparently had not foreseen. Over time, this political 
calculation became the rationale for the PPA to continue to operate off-
street parking facilities in competition with the private sector.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 As of late 2009, The Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA) owned and 
operated eight off-street parking facilities—garages and lots—in downtown 
Philadelphia, an area known as Center City.1 At the same time, there were 
134 commercial private-sector parking facilities in Center City.2 For 
economists, this is puzzling.3 Why is the public sector competing with the 
 
* Professor of Economics, Swarthmore College; Ph.D., Stanford University; B.A., Harvard 
University. I am grateful  to  Jonathan  Hum,  Swarthmore  ’11, for outstanding research 
assistance. I regret that this paper had to be written without the cooperation of the PPA. I 
asked the management of the PPA to provide me with background information about its 
operations and motives and to comment on an earlier draft of this paper, but it did not 
respond. There are no publicly available archives from the PPA from the mid-1960s 
onward.  
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private sector in this market? Does the presence of the PPA lots and 
garages affect the market for off-street parking in Center City, or would the 
market function more or less the same without them? If the presence of 
publicly-owned parking facilities has little impact on the downtown 
parking market, why then does the PPA remain in this business?  
 In this paper I seek to answer these questions. I ask initially whether the 
presence of publicly-owned off-street parking facilities has a significant 
effect on the supply or pricing of off-street parking. My conclusion is that it 
does not. So why is the public sector competing with the private sector in 
this business? I argue that one must take an historical and political 
perspective  to  answer  this  question.  In  brief,  Philadelphia’s  government 
entered the off-street parking market shortly after the end of World War II 
as it became apparent that the widespread use of the automobile was 
undermining the competitiveness of central city businesses, especially retail 
firms. The City also worried that the deterioration of Center City property 
values would reduce property tax revenues. Private entrepreneurs 
recognized the demand for off-street central city parking and began to 
retrofit or create structures to meet this need as early as the 1920s, but 
downtown business interests thought that the private sector was not 
meeting the need quickly or cheaply enough. Certainly, the Great 
Depression and war-time supply restrictions during the 1940s and early 
1950s hampered the ability of the private sector to build off-street parking 
structures. Once these constraints were lifted, the private sector could 
respond, but the political advocacy of downtown business interests and the 
desire by the City of Philadelphia to halt or slow the relative decline of 
Center City business activity and property values led the City to begin 
building off-street public parking facilities in the early 1950s.  
The City used a public authority to carry out this policy because a 
parking authority could be fiscally independent of the City, and its 
advocates argued that an authority would be apolitical and business-like. 
Shortly after its creation, however, local—and later state—politicians 
recognized that the PPA could be used for patronage employment and to 
support economic development goals of local politicians, something that 
early advocates of parking authorities either had either not foreseen or had 
ignored. In any case, I argue that there is no economic rationale for the 
contemporary PPA to operate off-street parking facilities, but there is a 
historical explanation for how it got into the business and a political 
rationale for it to continue.  
 
I. WHAT ROLE DO THE PPA’S GARAGES AND LOTS PLAY IN THE 
CENTER CITY PARKING MARKET? 
 In  this  section,  I  ask whether  the PPA’s Center City parking  facilities 
have a detectable impact on the downtown parking market.4 Before doing 
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so, however, I note that the PPA’s current rationale for being in the Center 
City off-street parking market is unspoken and unclear. There are no 
contemporary studies arguing that there is a shortage of off-street parking 
in Center City, nor are there recent studies arguing that market failures 
prevent the private sector from meeting the need for off-street parking. In 
fact, the prevailing view seems to be just the opposite. Richard Voith, for 
example, provides a careful economic analysis making the case that too 
much off-street parking can damage the economic productivity of a central 
business district (CBD), as well as its attractiveness to many workers and 
residents, by destroying its unique feature—a dense collection of office 
workers and residents who interact for business and leisure.5 These 
interactions foment and disseminate new ideas, sometimes serendipitously, 
which raise the productivity and excitement of the CBD. Abundant off-
street parking is antithetical to density and can diminish the productivity 
and vibrancy of a CBD. Inga Saffron, the Philadelphia  Inquirer’s 
architecture and urban planning critic, wrote a strident article supporting 
the view that Center City Philadelphia has more than enough off-street 
parking.6 In  any  case, my  review  (in August  2009) of PPA’s website did 
not find any explanation of why it operates downtown parking facilities.7  
 To keep this section reasonably brief, I do not delve further into the 
question of whether Center City has too little or too much parking, nor do I 
discuss whether the pricing of Center City off-street parking is optimal for 
the development of the downtown.8 Rather, I simply ask whether the 
supply or pricing of Center City off-street parking is detectably different 
because the PPA operates eight facilities there.  
 As of late 2009, PPA’s facilities accounted for about 13 percent of the 
off-street parking slots in Center City (see Table 1). It is of course, 
impossible to answer the counterfactual: If PPA had never existed, how 
many fewer slots might exist in the City? As I discuss in the section on the 
history of the PPA, there were no obvious market failures that prevented 
the private sector from supplying off-street parking, so it is reasonable to 
think that the private sector would have supplied a roughly equivalent 
number of aggregate Center City parking spots with or without the PPA. In 
any case, it is clear that if the PPA were to exit the business, it could 
presumably sell its eight facilities to private operators who would almost 
certainly continue to use them for parking in the foreseeable future since it 
would be very costly to convert them for another use. Alternatively, the 
PPA could retain ownership of the facilities and lease them to private-
sector operators, ensuring that they remain parking facilities for the term of 
the leases. Under either approach, the supply of Center City parking would 
be unaffected or barely affected for many years to come.  
 It is not clear what effects PPA’s parking facilities might have on prices 
in Center City. It depends on what the PPA is trying to accomplish with its 
off-street parking facilities (which it does not explain) and, in some cases, 
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how private-sector parking facilities react to its policies. The PPA might, 
for example, set its prices below the prices prevailing at private facilities. If 
the private facilities do not match the PPA prices, then the PPA’s facilities 
would offer a lower-cost alternative for off-street parkers. If the operators 
of private-sector parking facilities match, or nearly match  the  PPA’s 
parking rates, then the PPA might reduce general parking prices in Center 
City, or at least in the facilities near those of the PPA.  
Alternatively, the PPA could set its prices to maximize profits. If so, its 
prices should be similar to those of nearby private facilities, which are 
presumably doing the same thing. Since the PPA transfers its revenues, 
beyond those it judges necessary to support its long-term operations, to the 
City of Philadelphia and the Philadelphia School District, it might 
maximize profits in an effort to maximize this fiscal transfer.9  
Finally, if the PPA is seen primarily as a source of patronage 
employment (something I discuss later in the paper), it might seek to 
maximize its employment positions. In this case it would operate its own 
parking facilities rather than lease them to private-sector firms and would 
operate them with unnecessarily high levels of staffing or supervision. 
Under this scenario, it would set market-level prices but have below-market 
rates of return due to the featherbedding.   
 In order to compare prices at PPA facilities to those at private facilities, 
between July 22 and August 5 of 2009, I collected parking prices at all off-
street parking facilities in Center City Philadelphia, which I defined as 
reaching from the north side of South Street to south side of Vine Street 
and between Front Street and the Schuylkill River. During this time, I also 
collected  data  from  the  PPA’s website  and  from  the websites  of  private-
sector operators on the number of parking slots in each parking facility. In 
the relatively few cases in which data on the number of parking slots were 
not available for private-sector facilities, I made my own estimate while 
visiting the facility. Table 1 presents data on the market share of the PPA 
and the largest private-sector operators.10 Table 2 presents the average 
prices for three types of parking situations for the PPA facilities and for the 
private-sector parking facilities.11  
 As indicated in Table 1, the Center City off-street parking market is 
moderately concentrated. The three largest operators (one of which is the 
PPA) control slightly over half of the Center City parking slots.12 As shown 
in Table 2, the average price for parking at a PPA facility is below the 
average for parking at a private facility in all three pricing categories. This 
could mean that the PPA sets its prices below its competitors or that PPA 
facilities have less desirable locations or amenities. Certainly, prices for 
off-street parking vary by the location of the facilities.   
 As shown in Table 3, average prices vary across Center City 
geographical quadrants, but there is no consistent pattern. The quadrants 
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that are the most expensive for commuters can be the least expensive for 
evening parkers. As indicated in the bottom of the table, facilities that are 
located farther away from City Hall (the geographical central point of 
Center City) are on average less expensive than those that are close to City 
Hall. While this pattern is consistent across all three parking price 
categories, it does not hold for individual facilities. A facility that is far 
from City Hall but close to popular theaters, for example, might have a 
higher evening parking rate than one that is close to City Hall. 
  
Table 1: Parking Market Share in Center City 
Parking Firm  Number of Center City 
Parking Slots 
Market Share 
Central Parking  7,331  20.2% 
Parkway  6,809  18.7% 
Phil. Parking Authority  4,626  12.7% 
Interpark  3,289  9.0% 
Park America  2,872  7.9% 
FiveStar Parking  2,750  7.6% 
Patriot Parking  2,234  6.1% 
Expert Parking  1,921  5.3% 
EZ Park  1,551  4.3% 
Other parking firms  2,965  8.2% 
Total                     36,348 
    
  
 
Table 2: Average Parking Prices in Center City 
  All‐day rate   One‐hour mid‐day 
rate 
Peak evening rate 
(6–10 pm) 
PPA Average 
 
$12.97  $8.06  $9.11 
Average for Private 
Facilities 
$13.44  $10.77  $13.81 
 
 
  
Table 3: Parking Prices by Location Within Center City 
Average for:  All‐day rate for 
typical commuter 
One‐hour rate 
mid‐day 
Peak evening rate 
(6–10 pm)  
NE quadrant  $11.93  $10.98  $14.39 
NW quadrant  $15.24  $10.13  $10.22 
SE quadrant  $12.07  $10.03  $13.66 
SW quadrant  $14.72  $11.18  $14.47 ≤ 4 blocks  
from City Hall 
$15.55  $11.99  $14.87 ≥ 6 blocks  
from City Hall 
$12.59  $9.98  $12.96 
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 Given such variation in the pricing of parking by location, I examined 
the locations of the eight Center City PPA facilities and contrasted the 
prices for parking at these facilities to those at private facilities located 
within three blocks of the PPA locations. My analysis of these data leads 
me to the following conclusions.  
In all eight cases, the commuter rates charged at the PPA facilities are 
similar to those charged in nearby private garages. In seven out of eight 
cases, the one-hour mid-day rates at the PPA facilities are similar to those 
found in nearby private facilities. In one case, the PPA garage next to a 
Center City  shopping mall  (“The Gallery Mall”),  PPA’s  rate  is markedly 
lower than those at nearby private facilities. Finally, in half of the eight 
cases,  the  PPA’s  evening  parking  rates  are  similar  to  those  prevailing  in 
nearby private facilities. The four exceptions are the PPA rate at the 
Gallery Mall, the PPA rates at its two facilities at 15th and Arch, and the 
PPA evening rate at this garage at 1540 Spring Street. In these cases, PPA 
rates are modestly lower than those in nearby private facilities.  
 What do these pricing patterns suggest that the PPA is trying to 
accomplish with its parking facilities? The answer is unclear. Certainly the 
pricing for day-long  commuters’  parking  and  the  pricing  (with  one 
exception) for mid-day short term parking suggest that the prices for 
parking at PPA facilities are similar to those at nearby private facilities. It is 
theoretically possible that the PPA is setting its prices below those that 
would prevail near  its  facilities were  the PPA’s  facilities not present,  and 
that the private-sector facilities are lowering their prices to match 
approximately the PPA’s prices. But a comparison of the prices at private 
facilities near PPA facilities with the prices at private facilities at a 
significant distance from the PPA facilities does not support this 
hypothesis. Rather, it appears that the PPA sets its parking prices similarly 
to the way the private-sector facilities set theirs. This is consistent with the 
notion that the PPA is trying to maximize its earnings in order to maximize 
its fiscal transfers to the City and School District. It is also consistent with 
the notion that the PPA is maximizing earnings in order to create revenue 
to support the greatest number of patronage employment opportunities at 
the PPA. It could also be some combination of these two objectives.  
 In the case of peak evening parking rates, about half of the time the 
PPA rates are generally modestly below those prevailing in the surrounding 
private lots. This could suggest that the PPA is consciously setting 
somewhat lower rates in order to promote evening economic activity in 
Center City. It could also suggest that its facilities have a disadvantage in 
terms of location, perceived security, or amenities compared to the nearby 
lots, and that the lower prices are intended to offset such disadvantage. This 
latter view strikes me as likely to be correct, given that the PPA facilities 
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with the lower evening prices tend to be very large garages, underground 
garages, and/or old unadorned concrete garages.  
 There is a second striking pattern in the data: the wide variation in the 
prices for parking at nearby parking facilities. To some extent, this may 
reflect differences in the visibility, convenience, amenities, or perceived 
security of the facilities, but I strongly suspect that it also reflects 
information  problems  in  the market.  In  the  case  of  PPA’s  facility  at  the 
Gallery, at the time of my survey it charged $3 per hour for mid-day short-
term parking, which is less than a third of what most of the surrounding 
parking facilities were charging. Moreover, at the time of my survey this 
PPA garage (with 850 parking slots) appeared to have substantial numbers 
of open parking spaces. It is difficult to believe that the small differences in 
location or nature of the facilities justify such a large price differential. 
Rather, I speculate that most of the people paying $10 per hour or more 
were unaware that a nearby facility was charging $3 per hour.  
 In an ideal market, consumers have full information about the quality 
and prices of the goods or services that they are comparing. In choosing 
off-street parking, however, drivers have traditionally obtained pricing 
information, especially for short-term parking or infrequent parking, by 
driving from facility to facility and reading the posted pricing information, 
which is sometimes inconveniently posted. Given the associated search 
costs, owners of parking facilities have some pricing power. For instance, 
an owner of a facility that is nearly identical to another will still get some 
customers when he or she charges a somewhat higher price than its 
competitor.13  
 In any case, the data strongly suggest that PPA’s parking facilities have 
no significant impact on either the general price level or supply of parking 
in Center City parking market. If the PPA were to sell the facilities and exit 
the parking business, taking care to select buyers that would not create 
much more concentrated ownership in the market, most people parking in 
Center City would certainly not notice any difference. It is therefore 
puzzling why the PPA continues to own and operate Center City parking 
facilities.14 In what follows, I argue that one needs an historical and 
political perspective to provide the answer to this puzzle. Only an 
interdisciplinary perspective can lead to an understanding of contemporary 
public policy toward Philadelphia's downtown off-street parking market.  
 
II. WHEN AND WHY DID CITIES START TO PROVIDE  
OFF-STREET PARKING? 
 The very first automobiles were built at the turn of the 20th century, but 
by 1910 there were only about 468,000 automobiles and trucks registered 
across the nation.15 By 1913, however, Henry Ford had largely perfected 
the mass production of the Model T and other manufacturers were building 
far more reliable cars than they had just a few years earlier. As indicated in 
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Figure 1 below, the number of registered automobiles and trucks grew 
explosively between the early 1910s and 1929.16 In 1929, there were 26.5 
million registered cars and trucks in the country.  
 
 
 
 Although motor vehicle registrations declined somewhat in the face of 
the Great Depression, it resumed its growth after 1933. By the 1930s, it was 
common for many office workers and downtown shoppers—who a few 
years earlier would have taken a streetcar—to drive their cars to downtown 
locations. As Richard Seltzer noted in his 1942 study of trends in 
Philadelphia, “While the number of people entering and leaving the central 
district in the year 1938 is 11% less than in 1928, the total number of 
vehicles transporting these passengers has increased 30%.”17 
 The explosive growth in car ownership created tremendous congestion 
in the dense urban centers of large American cities. Certainly, these cities 
had struggled with congestion before, especially as streetcars and delivery 
wagons competed for use of city streets in the late 1800s. But the arrival of 
the automobile introduced a new problem that cities had not faced with 
streetcars: where to park them when people drove into dense urban centers. 
When cars were rare in the 1910s, they could generally be easily 
accommodated parked alongside city streets. By the mid-1920s, this was 
increasingly problematic.  
 From the beginning of the development of the automobile, car owners 
had to store them. In their book, Lots of Parking: Land Use in a Car 
Culture, John Jakle and Keith Sculle explain that the automobiles of the 
early 1910s were ill-equipped to function in winter and their owners often 
sought to store them in a building during inclement weather.18 
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Entrepreneurs responded by leasing space in livery stables or other such 
structures and by constructing parking garages in urban areas:  
By 1915, most cities contained at least a few garages purposely 
built for car parking. Early storage garages, irrespective of their 
origin, were used primarily for long-term parking, especially 
winter storage in cities where open or unenclosed cars precluded 
year-round use.19  
 In the late 1910s and early 1920s, the streets in large cities were 
becoming crowded with parked cars and, since the cars were winterized by 
that time, this was a year-round phenomenon. In many cases, downtown 
parking was haphazard, with some cars parallel parking, some parked at 
angles, some on sidewalks, some in medians, etc. This greatly impeded the 
flow of traffic and led to two reactions. First, municipal governments began 
to regulate curbside parking.20 Second, entrepreneurs began to build 
facilities for off-street parking: 
By 1920, every large city had dozens of small business 
entrepreneurs variously experimenting with parking as a profit 
making enterprise. …In Philadelphia, W.W. Smith started with a 
single lot in 1921, rapidly expanding in 5 years to 20 lots and 8 
garages. … Philadelphia’s downtown parking operations occupied 
lots cleared of buildings, with corner lots being preferred.21 
 The destruction of old buildings and the conversion of the cleared land 
into parking lots accelerated in the 1930s. With the onset of the Great 
Depression, many landlords found that they could not rent their office 
space or residential properties, or that they had to rent the space at much 
reduced rates. Municipal governments, however, did not reduce property 
taxes commensurately. Landlords responded by demolishing their buildings 
and replacing them with parking lots. Property taxes on land without 
structures were much lower and the cleared lots could earn revenue 
meeting the demand for off-street parking.22 
 This situation certainly applied to Philadelphia. The Philadelphia 
Evening Bulletin reported the results from a City of Philadelphia study that 
found 178 parking lots in Center City covering 38 acres.23 Most were 
created through the destruction of old buildings, including some historical 
landmarks. The study estimated that the City lost at least $400,000 a year in 
tax revenue from such land use conversions.  
 Beginning in the 1930s, cities began to permit some municipally-owned 
land to be used for parking. In all cases that I have found, the cities 
provided parking lots—not garages—and the cities apparently either rented 
the land to a private-sector operator who charged customers to park their 
cars or simply permitted free parking on the land. As Orin Nolting and Paul 
Opperman noted in 1938: 
Off-street parking lots are a new municipal activity. Thirty-three 
cities in at least 17 states, or about one-fourth of the cities covered 
in this study, have established such facilities, while several 
additional cities are considering plans for developing municipal 
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parking areas….In most instances the land was already owned by 
the city and was not acquired specifically for parking purposes…. 
Only two of the 33 cities charge a fee for parking. The charge at 
the Grant Park area near Michigan Boulevard in Chicago is 25 
cents for 24 hours.24  
 In the case of Philadelphia, it is unclear when the city first began to use 
city-owned land for parking. In a Philadelphia Evening Bulletin article of 
1935, however, it is evident that the city was already leasing some of its 
land to private-sector operators of parking lots at that time.25  
 There is no careful economic analysis that I could find, from the 1930s 
through the 1950s, to explain why municipal governments had to provide a 
service that the private sector was also providing. The common explanation 
of the era was that downtown businesses were suffering relative to those in 
the newly developing suburbs because of an absence of low-cost parking in 
central business districts. In addition, tax revenues from the central 
business districts were declining relative to revenues from outlying areas 
due to falling relative property values. But no analyst provided a theoretical 
rationale for why the private sector would not provide sufficient downtown 
parking.26 Typically, analysts of the era would write that downtown land 
was too expensive to justify use as parking facilities. In other words, 
advocates for downtown municipal parking facilities wanted government-
subsidized parking, though they rarely stated this explicitly.  
 Nolting and Opperman, for example, argued in 1938 that the lack 
of downtown parking was a major factor behind the decentralization of 
cities:  
It is easier in these days of excessive traffic to get to where you 
are going than to dispose of your automobile at its destination—if 
the terminal point is in the central business district. Universal 
ownership of automobiles has created a demand for terminal 
facilities in central business districts that is of great concern not 
only to municipal officials but to business interests and above all 
to the drivers of motor vehicles. Not many years ago these 
parking  requirements were met without great difficulty….Unless 
improvements are forthcoming shoppers who arrive in autos will 
tend to seek sections possessing greater convenience, and the 
trend toward decentralization will be still further augmented.27  
Based on this analysis, the authors concluded: 
Many traffic authorities argue that the provision of adequate 
parking space in or near business districts is a public 
responsibility and that only through municipal ownership can 
adequate provision be made for permanent terminal parking 
facilities. Merchants realize that parking facilities are essential to 
business and that if the problem is not solved a costly 
decentralization of business will result.28  
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 In a 1942 study planning for the post-World War II redevelopment of 
Philadelphia, Richard Seltzer made the same point.29 He argued that 
parking difficulties in Center City encouraged businesses to locate outside 
of the central business district, 
The difficulties encountered in parking leads many prospective 
purchasers to buy in outlying districts and, due to the limited time 
permitted on the streets for parking, the number of purchases 
made by many others is curtailed.30  
Anne Alpern reached a similar conclusion in her analysis of the issue 
in Pittsburgh, stating that the movement of business toward the suburbs 
had made downtown business interests acutely aware of the “close 
relationship between adequate parking and economic survival of the 
central business districts.”31  
 Another, related rationale that advocates for municipal parking facilities 
provided was the decline in downtown tax revenues. Alpern, for example, 
in her law review article advocating municipal off-street parking facilities, 
wrote of  the “tremendous  tax  losses” due  to “the exodus  from  the city  to 
suburban areas because of traffic congestion and the unavailability of 
parking  space”.32 Similarly, Edward Mogren, writing in 1953 for the 
automobile-industry-funded Eno Foundation, stated:  
Municipalities, large and small throughout the country, are 
experiencing the same deterioration in downtown area tax paying 
potentiality….There are other contributing causes, but parking 
deficiencies are one of the most important reasons for the 
substantial declines of these various city district tax revenues.33  
In addition, while Mogren did not claim that the private sector could not 
provide the proper amount of off-street parking, he argued that for 
unexplained reasons the private sector was responding too slowly:34 
Many municipalities have taken action to ease their parking 
problems. Leadership has been assumed by municipal 
administrators who believe implicitly in private enterprise but feel 
that their city cannot and should not go without this service 
because private interest has lagged in providing it.35  
Beyond the arguments that municipal governments had to enter the off-
street parking business either to save downtown business districts or to 
prevent the decline in tax revenues, there were other rationales advanced 
for why municipal governments were especially suitable for this purpose. 
Mogren, for example, argued that there could be coordination and planning 
problems if the provision of off-street parking were left to the private 
sector: 
Curb parking regulations are administered by the municipality. 
Most effective regulation of curb parking cannot be obtained 
unless a coordinated agency controls off-street parking as well.... 
 Reasonably complete parking relief cannot be realized 
through the undirected and sporadic efforts of private initiative 
alone. Long-range solutions must contemplate both short-time 
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(shopper) and long-time (worker) parking needs and follow 
comprehensive plans for facility development and location.36  
 The problem with Mogren’s  rationale  is  that he does not explain why 
there would be such coordination problems if off-street parking were left to 
the private sector, especially given that local governments have zoning 
powers. It is not sufficient, to cite a hypothetical example, to argue that the 
local government must construct downtown office buildings because it 
already has the responsibility for the adjacent public streets. One must 
explain why the private sector and the government cannot divide these 
responsibilities without significant coordination problems.  
 These authors of the 1930s through 1950s did not openly call for 
subsidized off-street parking in central business districts. Jakle and Sculle, 
however, recognized that this was the implication if the public sector was 
to build off-street parking that would be low-cost for the customers:  
Private interests might finance peripheral lots, but government 
subsidy was necessary for truly close-in parking, given that land 
costs remained high in downtown cores. Center-core parking, and 
certainly free or even low-cost parking located there, absolutely 
required municipal subsidy.37  
To economists, these explanations for why municipal governments 
should enter the downtown off-street parking market are puzzling. 
Traditionally, economists argue for government intervention in a 
market if there are natural monopolies, externalities, or public goods. 
In the case of off-street parking, none of these classic market failures 
seems to be present. None of the authors argued that private 
monopolies controlled the market, and none argued that externalities 
led to an undersupply of parking. Off-street parking is certainly not a 
public good; it is easy to exclude those who do not pay for the 
service.38 
 Not all analysts of downtown parking problems called for 
municipalities to build and operate facilities. Writing in 1927 about the 
growing need for downtown off-street parking, Hawley Simpson argued 
that:  
Private capital should be given every encouragement to establish 
storage garages, and cities should refrain from entering a field in 
which there appears no logical reasons for municipal operation. 
Even operation of sub-surface garages under public property is 
not necessarily a municipal function, and private operation with 
its greater potential economics, will better serve the public good.39  
Similarly, Richard Seltzer, writing in 1942, blamed inadequate parking 
for the relative decline of Center City Philadelphia, but he did not call 
for a public sector solution. Rather, Seltzer recommended that Center 
City stores form cooperatives to operate parking lots and garages and 
that they subsidize the parking for their customers.40  
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It is…recommended that merchant groups lease or otherwise 
obtain possession of vacant lots in proximity to their places of 
business and operate them on a co-operative basis whereby a 
person entering the store, or those making purchases, may park 
free of charge, or at little expense, for a limited time.41  
 One can argue, of course, that the residents of outlying areas benefit if a 
city’s CBD is healthy. Certainly, studies have found that the prosperity of 
suburban communities is linked to the prosperity of the central cities they 
surround.42 Thus, there could be externalities to any activity that benefits 
the CBD. This could justify state- or metropolitan-level subsidies for 
economic development initiatives in the CBD. It is far from clear, however, 
that parking is the activity that is most deserving of subsidies. It could be, 
for example, that reducing CBD property taxes or subsidizing the arts 
would have a larger impact on CBD development than would building 
municipally-operated parking facilities. Moreover, if the government 
determines that it should subsidize parking, it could simply subsidize 
parking in privately-owned facilities.  
 In summary, although not all public policy analysts who focused on 
downtown parking issues prior to the 1950s called for the creation of 
subsidized public parking facilities, the majority did. Their explicit or 
implicit reasoning—and  that  reasoning’s  consequences—was as follows. 
By the 1920s, automobiles became a major means of transportation for the 
middle class. Because storing automobiles takes enormous amounts of 
space, dense CBDs were not compatible with cars. Many businesses that 
traditionally located in CBDs, especially large retail stores, moved to 
outlying locations that were built to accommodate the automobile. This led 
to a decline in CBD property values and a general awareness that the CBD 
was losing its regional preeminence. Given the demand for parking in 
CBDs and the decline in property values, private-sector developers began 
to build parking facilities in downtowns. But since many important 
institutions and venues, such as government buildings, public transit hubs, 
and cultural venues, were located in the CBD, downtown land remained 
more expensive than outlying land. Thus, private-sector parking operators 
had to charge more for parking downtown than their competitors in the 
newly-developing outlying areas who, in fact, often offered abundant free 
parking.43 This further encouraged decentralization and a slow relative 
decline in property values in the CBD. Downtown property owners 
resented this and argued for government-subsidized parking to reverse or 
offset the trend. In other words, there was not a valid economic justification 
for building government-subsidized off-street parking, but there was a 
political rationale.  
 
III. WHY A PARKING AUTHORITY? 
 Regardless of whether it was good policy for municipal governments to 
begin to build and operate CBD off-street parking facilities, many were 
14 WILLIAM & MARY POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 1:25 
 
 
doing so by the late 1930s. This continued after World War II ended, but 
with a twist. After the war, municipal governments began to ask their state 
legislatures  to allow  them  to create parking “authorities”  to undertake  the 
work. In fact, Pennsylvania was the first state to enact legislation allowing 
a municipal government to create an authority to build and operate off-
street parking facilities.44 The state passed the legislation in 1947, and 
Pittsburgh immediately used this law to create its parking authority. 
Numerous other states enacted similar legislation in the next few years.45  
 There were several rationales for creating authorities to build and 
operate parking facilities. The authorities were empowered to acquire land 
for parking and to issue their own bonds to raise money for the land 
acquisition and to build the facilities. They could pledge future parking fee 
revenues to repay the bonds. As Alpern explained in 1950, this was a key 
motivation for the creation of the authorities: 
Decreased assessed valuations and limitations on borrowing 
power have placed most cities in a financial strait jacket from 
which they have been able to extricate themselves by means of 
the “authority” device. Parking authorities are able  to defray the 
cost of construction by the issuance of bonds payable out of 
revenues. Authorities provide a speedy method for the solution of 
the traffic problem without imposing an additional burden upon 
the taxpayers.46  
The authorities could function similarly to private businesses because their 
actions did not need the approval of a city council or a state legislature. 
They were governed by a board of directors whose members were 
generally appointed by state or municipal politicians, but the board could 
function in a very business-like fashion and was expected to be somewhat 
isolated from political pressures since the members did not stand for direct 
election. Thus, the authorities were expected to be relatively more efficient 
and apolitical than a city department charged with building and operating 
parking facilities.  As Mogren explained in his 1953 book on parking 
authorities,  “Because of their autonomous nature, parking authorities are 
free of political pressures often found in municipal government …. Being 
dependent on their own earnings for continuation, there is an incentive to 
develop high management and personnel efficiency.”47 The state legislation 
creating the parking authorities generally gave them the power of eminent 
domain, so they could force the sale of privately-owned property in order to 
assemble land for parking purposes. Alpern argued that this power was 
critical to their effectiveness: “One of the most important powers given to 
parking authorities by legislative enactment is the power to condemn 
property for parking purposes.”48  
 In the case of Pennsylvania, however, this power was apparently rarely 
used in the ten years that followed the 1947 legislation. In a 1957 study of 
that state’s parking authorities, Nelson Guild reported,  
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The power of eminent domain granted to parking authorities by 
the enabling legislation, is generally used only as a last resort. Of 
the 25 authorities reporting in this survey, only two exercised this 
power in acquiring all properties. Five authorities condemned 10 
per cent or less of their sites and 14 authorities did not resort to 
condemnation proceedings at all.49  
Not surprisingly, some private-sector interests—especially those that 
owned off-street parking facilities—objected to the creation of government 
authorities that could build and operate parking facilities that would 
compete with private businesses. Advocates of parking authorities, such as 
Mogren, argued that parking authorities would not threaten private-sector 
interests since, according to him, their purpose was:  
[N]ot to exclude private enterprise from the parking field. Rather, 
where substantial services are rendered by privately developed 
facilities, parking authority activity is aimed at supplementing 
such operation and stimulating extension of private installations. 
In areas where private initiative in parking is ineffective or non-
existent, authority activities are directed toward coordinating city-
sponsored facilities into a comprehensive system. Merchant and 
businessmen cooperation in the development of attractive, 
serviceable parking areas is possible under authority parking 
management.50  
Nevertheless, Pennsylvania’s 1947 law allowing parking authorities to use 
the power of eminent domain was challenged in court. A Pittsburgh 
resident sued that city’s  parking  authority,  arguing  that  the  purpose  for 
which the land was seized did not constitute a proper public use. The 
plaintiff  was  joined  in  the  proceedings  by  the  “Downtown  Parking 
Association, a voluntary association of owners and operators of parking 
facilities in the downtown area...” of Pittsburgh.51  
 The case went to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which ruled in 
favor of the Parking Authority without offering an explanation for why the 
private sector alone could not meet the need for off-street parking. In its 
ruling, the court explained:  
Those attacking the constitutionality of such a law…obviously 
labor under the mistaken assumption that its purpose is merely to 
cater to the convenience of the owners and operators of motor 
vehicles…its real purpose is to promote larger and more general 
good of the community by freeing the streets of the impediments 
and perils arising from dangerous and often intolerable conditions 
of traffic congestion….It  is no constitutional objection to the 
statute, nor does it derogate from the public character of its 
objective, that the Authority will to some extent conduct what 
may heretofore have been regarded as a private enterprise…52 
 As this section indicates, public parking authorities were created to 
isolate from city budgets the fiscal impact of building parking 
facilities. They were expected to be apolitical, business-like 
organizations. They were given the power of eminent domain but, at 
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least in Pennsylvania in the early years, this power was rarely used. 
They competed with private-sector parking facilities, but generally did 
so gingerly. In Pennsylvania, the courts supported this public/private 
competition, but did not provide an economic rationale for why the 
private sector alone could not meet the need for off-street downtown 
parking.  
 
IV. THE PPA AND OFF-STREET PARKING IN CENTER CITY 
 In Philadelphia’s  case, the creation of the PPA generally follows the 
factors outlined above, except for the PPA's growing role as a patronage 
employer. In the early 1950s, there was a widespread perception that 
Center City did not have enough off-street parking and that this was hurting 
its regional competitiveness. The state believed that a public authority was 
the best means for building off-street parking facilities, and the City used 
this mechanism to respond to downtown business interests that worried that 
insufficient, low-cost parking was hurting their sales. Very soon after the 
creation of the PPA, however, local—and later state—politicians began to 
view it as a source of patronage employment. Over time, this political role 
clearly became the main rationale for the public sector to maintain 
ownership and operation of off-street parking in competition with the 
private sector. 
 In January of 1950, the Philadelphia City Council organized the PPA 
under  the state’s parking authority  law. One would expect  that downtown 
property owners (other than owners of private parking facilities) and 
commercial interests would see this as a step toward the construction of 
favorable government-subsidized parking. One would also expect owners 
of private parking facilities to oppose it. News accounts of the time suggest 
that this was indeed the case.  
Philadelphia’s City Council last Thursday passed the Philadelphia 
Parking Authority Ordinance, a measure opposed by most of the 
city’s  parking  lot  and  garage  operators.  What  swayed  the 
councilmen were much more influential voices—those of 
mercantile, industrial and financial organizations whose interests 
are intertwined with the business health of the city. The Chamber 
of Commerce, the Philadelphia Merchants Association, the City 
Planning Commission, the Keystone Automobile Club and the 
American Automobile Association, the Redevelopment Authority, 
the Philadelphia Highway Traffic Board, and the City Traffic 
Engineer all agreed with the need for action.53 
 Contemporary news accounts also suggested that a strong factor behind 
the push to have a government-owned parking authority construct parking 
facilities was the perception that the private sector had not met the need. 
The Philadelphia Inquirer reported that,  “[B]etween 28,000 and 30,000 
[people driving cars] have business in the teeming, congested blocks that 
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lay between Walnut and Arch Streets, stretching from 4th to 18th. And they 
want to park their cars not too far away.”54 It went on to note that this area 
had only 3,500 off-street parking places and that the Philadelphia Highway 
Traffic Board estimated that this created a deficiency of 23,000 spaces.  
 Shortage of parking spaces in Center City in the early 1950s was not a 
universal perception. Certainly, garage owners, who opposed the creation 
of the PPA, argued that there was no shortage. But it is reasonable to think 
that a lack of construction during the Great Depression, the rationing of 
materials for civilian use during the 1940s and early 1950s, and increasing 
rates of automobile usage would have created a shortage of downtown 
parking. If so, one would expect the private sector to respond by building 
more parking as soon as these constraints eased. In other words, the 
problem would likely have been solved by a bit of patience since there 
were no fundamental market failures that prevented the private sector from 
responding. Indeed, news accounts indicate that the private sector was 
anxious to build new facilities. In 1952, for example, promoters of a 500-
space private parking garage sued the PPA (unsuccessfully) to try to 
prevent it from building a competing nearby public parking garage. The 
backers of the private garage explained that they were delayed with their 
project only because “[d]emolition of existing buildings has been 
delayed...because of the national emergency and government restrictions on 
critical materials.”55   
 In launching a parking authority whose mission was to build off-street 
parking facilities, government officials were clearly sensitive to the charge 
that the government was entering a market that was traditionally served by 
the private sector. As the Philadelphia Inquirer reported within a few days 
of the City Council’s approval of the agency:  
Everyone connected with the decision to put the city into the 
parking business, at least as a “silent partner” to private operators, 
has expressed regret that it must be done, but private industry, 
they  declare,  has  failed  to  find  an  answer,  and  so  it’s  up  to  the 
city.56 
According to the New York Times the new chairman of the PPA announced 
that “the authority had no intention of competing against the privately 
operated garages.”57  
 Once the PPA was operational, it decided to focus on Center City 
because this is where it believed there was the greatest need and because its 
limited initial staffing and funding ($150,000 in loans from the City) 
permitted it to undertake a very small number of projects.58 The PPA 
settled on two initial projects: a  parking  garage  facing  one  of  the  city’s 
most elegant small parks, Rittenhouse Square, and a second garage several 
blocks away on Chestnut Street between 10th and 11th. In neither case did 
the PPA use its power of eminent domain to acquire land. Both garages 
were designed to hold approximately 500 cars.59 Despite some delays due 
to steel shortages during the Korean War, the Walnut Street garage opened 
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at the end of 1953 and the Chestnut Street garage in 1954. In the ensuing 
years, the PPA added eight other Center City parking facilities to its 
original two and, in 1985, sold the one it built across from Rittenhouse 
Square to an insurance company.60 As noted, the PPA leases one of its 
facilities to a private sector firm, so the PPA currently operates eight 
parking facilities in Center City.  
 Once war-time constraints eased, the private sector also began to 
respond to the need for Center City parking. By 1957, one news account 
noted that the PPA was losing money on its two original garages and cited 
a survey that found a surplus of spaces around these facilities.61 It 
explained that downtown retail interests wanted still more public parking 
based on the theory that “where there is parking, there will be parkers—and 
shoppers.” It noted, however, that private sector investors had a different 
view: “[D]emand must be present and accounted for before a parking 
facility—private or public—can be justified.”62  
 Once it was decided, rightly or wrongly, that the public sector should 
build garages, one of the rationales for creating parking authorities was that 
such agencies would be subject to far less political pressure than would a 
department of city government. In the case of the PPA, however, astute 
Philadelphia politicians, and later Pennsylvania state politicians, quickly 
took advantage of their ability to appoint the PPA’s board members, PPA’s 
exemption from civil service hiring requirements, and its ability to award 
some no-bid contracts to favored businesses. In 1950, when the PPA was 
created, a Republican political machine had long controlled Philadelphia’s 
government.  The Republican mayor appointed five men, with staggered 
terms, to the PPA board. The chair, who had a five-year term, was Francis. 
J. Chesterman, a retired president of the Bell Telephone Company of 
Pennsylvania. The board hired a former Republican deputy city treasurer to 
be the managing director.63 At the same time, a group of young Democrats 
was laying the groundwork to gain control of city council and the mayor’s 
office.64 In late 1951, the city elected a Democrat, Joseph S. Clark, as 
mayor. Within two years of Clark’s assuming office, Chesterman resigned 
as chair of the PPA, telling the mayor, “[Y]ou have decided to yield to long 
term pressure by the Democratic city organization to treat the authority as a 
political plum”.65 The mayor denied this, but he did acknowledge  that,  “I 
had been urged to reconstitute the board of the Parking Authority with 
individuals who were sympathetic to the aims of my administration and 
who would retain as executives and counsel men who did not owe their 
primary allegiance to the Republican city organization…”66 
 As the Democratic machine began to dominate Philadelphia politics 
from the mid-1950s onward, the PPA became a part of that very machine, 
providing employment positions to Democratic ward leaders, committee 
members, and out-of-office politicians.67 In a gentlemen’s agreement with 
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the Republican Party, the PPA also hired a smaller number of Republican 
ward leaders and committee members.  
 This situation was relatively stable between the late 1950s and 2001, 
but as the Parking Authority added new responsibilities—especially when 
it took on the job of enforcing on-street parking regulations—employment 
at the agency ballooned. In 1972, the PPA reportedly had just seven full-
time employees.68 By 1977, it had taken the responsibility of providing 
security for the public parking facilities at the airport and had 
approximately 77 full-time workers, 32 of whom were retired or disable 
policemen hired under Mayor Rizzo’s administration. Mayor Rizzo was the 
former Police Commissioner of Philadelphia. The most highly paid 
employees tended to be politically active Democrats or relatives of such 
people. But the same news article that reported these facts also noted that 
“the authority has taken the position that it is only a quasipublic agency and 
is independent of the city government. As a result, authority records often 
are  difficult  to  get.”69 Rizzo was not apologetic about using the PPA to 
employ his supporters.  As  he  explained,  “There’s  not  much  patronage 
around anymore with everything civil service and (the authority) is the only 
area  where  you  can  help  people  who  help  politically…Patronage  always 
has been a way of life  in America….It’s even done in private industry.”70 
By 1982, employment at the PPA had grown to 215.71 In the next year, it 
was scheduled to double, as the PPA was given responsibility for enforcing 
on-street parking regulations as well as managing its off-street parking 
facilities. Over the next two decades, PPA employment and responsibilities 
continued to grow.  
 In 2001, the Republicans shocked the Democrats and the City by using 
their control of the state legislature and governor’s office to take control of 
the PPA. The state legislature passed a law that gave the governor the right 
to appoint the PPA’s board. The law also temporarily increased the number 
of board members from five to eleven. The governor promptly appointed 
six Republicans to the board, giving them a voting majority.72 The previous 
five board members’ positions phased out as  their six-year terms expired, 
and the board continued with just the six new members, who were given 
ten-year terms. Although this gave the Republicans firm control of the PPA 
for  a period of  time,  the Republicans  continued  to honor  the gentlemen’s 
agreement with the Democrats that the PPA would provide patronage 
positions to both Democrats and Republicans. As the Philadelphia Inquirer 
reported, 
Six Philadelphia ward leaders—five Republican, one Democrat—
and at least 174 city Republican and Democratic committee 
members  were  on  the  Authority’s  payroll  as  of  August 
[2007]…"When  the  Republicans took over, they did a smart 
thing: They sat down with the people in the leadership over there 
and said, ‘We’re not going to commandeer this place,’” said City 
Councilman Frank Rizzo, a Republican.73 Before the state 
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takeover, the informal agreement between  the  city’s Democratic 
and Republican bosses was that about one of every three 
patronage jobs at the Parking Authority would go to Republicans. 
That ratio has roughly reversed since the Republicans took 
command.74  
 In 2004, the state legislature designated the PPA to enforce taxi cab 
regulations in the City and gave it some other minor new responsibilities. 
Employment at the agency continued to expand. According to an 
independent report  for  the City of Philadelphia’s Office of  the Controller 
on the PPA, as of mid-2009 the PPA employed nearly 1,100 full- and part-
time personnel.75 The off-street parking division employed 11, on-street 
parking employed 639, and airport parking employed 187.76 70 people are 
employed in administration and 19 in strategic planning.   
 In addition to its role as a patronage employment agency, the PPA has 
been used by local politicians to subsidize business development initiatives 
in the City and, in one case, to help recover from a failed private-sector 
development initiative. In the 1970s, for example, the PPA built its garage 
adjacent to a new Center City shopping mall (“The Gallery”) as part of an 
agreement  with  the  mall’s  developer.77 In 2001, a failed private-sector 
effort to develop a site at 8th and Market into an entertainment complex left 
a huge hole in  the ground along one of Center City’s main thoroughfares. 
Since City politicians had been major advocates of this project and had 
committed public subsidies for the project, the gaping hole was evidence of 
a glaring failure. The PPA stepped in, bought the site for $12 million, 
paved it over, and turned it into a parking lot.78  
 
CONCLUSION 
 There appears to be no good economic rationale for the public off-street 
parking option in Center City Philadelphia. The PPA could exit the 
business and there would be almost no detectable effect on the price or 
supply of downtown off-street parking. Answering the  question,  “If  not, 
why does it then exist?” requires an historical and political perspective.  
 In the early 1950s, it was widely perceived that there existed a shortage 
of off-street parking in Center City and that this shortage hurt downtown 
business interests, downtown growth, and property values. This perception 
was probably justified given the increasing rates of automobile ownership 
and limited private-sector construction of all types during the Great 
Depression, World War II, and the Korean War. It was in this period that 
the PPA was created and began to build public parking facilities in 
response to political pressures from downtown retail business interests and 
in an effort to halt or slow the relative decline in Center City property 
values. At the same time, as the constraints eased for the private sector, it 
also built new facilities since there were no fundamental market failures 
that prevented it from doing so. Simply put, the PPA may have accelerated 
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the supply response, but left to its own devices, there was no reason that the 
private sector would not have met the need.  
 Shortly after the PPA was created local—and later state—politicians 
realized that the parking authority could be used to provide patronage jobs 
and support for favored regional development projects. That is, whatever 
the historical merit for the public sector to enter the downtown off-street 
parking market, once it did, the rationale for remaining in that market over 
the decades became political rather than economic.  
 
1 The PPA also owns and operates a parking facility at 19th and Callowhill, which is outside of the 
geographic boundaries that I use to define “Center City.” In addition, it owns a parking garage at 8th 
and Arch, but it leases this to a private-sector operator, so I include this as a private garage in my 
analysis.  
2 This only counts private facilities that are open to the general public.  
3Although as far as I am aware, contemporary economists have not analyzed public provision of 
downtown off-street parking, I am not the first to note that it is a curious phenomenon. Indeed, a 
1952 news article in the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin noted that the 1952 Municipal Year Book 
reported that 465 of the 1,137 American cities with populations over 10,000 owned and operated off-
street parking facilities. Another 19 of these cities owned such facilities but leased them to private 
operators. The article stated, “These are curious figures in a land supposedly dedicated to the prin-
ciple of private enterprise.” City Parking Lots, PHILA. EVENING BULL., July 29, 1952, at 3. 
4 I should note that, since many cities have publicly-owned parking facilities, some of my analysis 
applies more broadly than just to Philadelphia. But cities have their unique histories and local struc-
tures, so one should be cautious in extrapolating the lessons from Philadelphia to other cities. In 
addition, the PPA operates parking facilities outside of Center City, such as around the Philadelphia 
Airport. One should not automatically assume that the conclusions I reach for the PPA’s role in the 
downtown parking market apply to such other geographic contexts. 
5 Richard Voith, The Downtown parking Syndrome: Does Curing the Illness Kill the Patient? FED. 
RES. BANK OF PHILA. BUS. R. (January/February 1998). 
6 Inga Saffron, Heading toward Garage City? PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 21, 2000, at 1. 
7 The PPA does not produce any publicly-distributed material on its operations, such as an annual 
report or data on its performance.  
8 A second justification for not tackling these issues is that the City could address these concerns 
using zoning laws, taxes, and subsidies as an alternative to a public-sector parking option.  
9 The agreement about the transfer of PPA’s “profits” to the City and School District is actually more 
nuanced than this sentence conveys, but the details are not important to the fundamental point.  
10 I assumed that parking facilities that are operated under different names have different ownership. 
Since most of these firms are privately-held and do not release information about their ownership, 
this need not be the case, i.e. the owners of “Park-a-Lot” could also be the owners or partial owners 
of “Best Deal Parking.” Of the listed private parking firms in Center City, Central Parking is a public 
company and Interpark is a subsidiary of GE Capital, a public company. 
11 The peak evening rate is usually the rate for parking on a Friday or Saturday night. Table 2 
presents simple unweighted averages. An alternative approach would be to weight the price data by 
the size of the facility. I did not do this because I did not always have an accurate measure of the size 
of the facility. In addition, some facilities are rarely filled, and it is not clear that consistently unused 
spaces should receive the same weight as a frequently used space.  
12 Based on the data in the table, the Herfindahl Index for the market is 1,270, but this is a slight 
overestimate since several firms operate in the category of “other parking firms.” In my calculation 
of the Herfindahl Index, I treated the small firms in this category as one firm. An index of 1,270 
indicates that the market is moderately concentrated but, since the third largest firm is a public-sector 
firm, it is not clear that a traditional Herfindahl Index is meaningful. 
13 That is, the parking industry is monopolistically competitive, where the parking facilities are diffe-
rentiated by location and amenities. This means that each parking facility has some local monopoly 
power and sets its price above its marginal cost. Significant customer search costs increase a loca-
tion’s monopoly  power.  The  parking  facilities may  engage  in  complex  strategic  interactions  over 
prices and locations. Richard Arnott presents an analysis and theoretical model that captures some of 
22 WILLIAM & MARY POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 1:25 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
the complexity. Richard Arnott, Spatial Competition between Parking Garages and Downtown 
Parking Policy, 13 TRANS. POL’Y 458 (2006). A truly general model would probably be intractable.  
14 Someone might argue that the PPA should keep its Center City parking facilities because it makes 
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